THE CRISIS IN THE WHITE COMMITTEE by McBane, Richard L.
T H E C R I S I S IN T H E W H I T E 
C O M M I T T E E 
R I C H A R D L . M C B A N E 
In December, 1940, the long struggle in the United States between the 
isolationists and those who favored aid to the allies was building to a climax. 
The resources of Great Britain were almost exhausted. The issue of United 
States aid had become of the utmost importance in the outcome of the European 
war . The leading force for American aid was the Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies, commonly known as the "White Committee^ 
after its chairman, William Allen White. 
WhiteTs committee, and White's leadership in particular, had already 
been of importance in shaping public opinion and securing Congressional 
approval for Franklin Roosevelt's "destroyers-for-bases" deal with the 
British. In December there were indications that the administration was again 
going to count on the committee to be in the forefront of a battle to secure 
aid for Britain. * But the committee was already in the throes of an internal 
policy struggle which would affect the nature and degree of influence it could 
bring to bear . Moreover, it was under attack by the leading isolationist 
pressure groups. The result was a severe crisis within the committee which 
culminated in the resignation of White. 
William Allen White had attained a ra re degree of respect during a 
lifetime as editor of his own Emporia, Kansas, Gazette. He had a personal 
following not only in his native mid-west, but throughout the country. In 1940, 
at the age of 72, there was probably not another man so universally esteemed 
in the United States. But, in 1940, he was in a position where he would have 
to exercise every ounce of the esteem he possessed, both within the commit-
tee, and without, in order to maintain the influence of the committee. 
White was by nature a gentle but outspoken man who had first reached 
national prominence in the 1896 presidential campaign between William 
McKinley and William Jennings Bryan. He had always been intensely inter-
ested in the welfare of the people, and of the country. Gradually he moved 
into more active political roles when he took part in the Progressive Party 
movement of 1912-1916. In the 1930'she conducted a fight in Kansas against 
the Ku Klux Klan. Throughout this period he took an enlightened view of 
America's role in international affairs .2 
In 1915, when the United States was a much more naive and isolationist 
nation than it was 25 years later, White was already writing, "War is abroad 
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in Europe. To ignore it, to declare that we are protected by our geographical 
position is folly."3 When war threatened the world a second time in the late 
1930 *s White tried to find an effective way for the United States to protect it-
self without actually entering the conflict. 
In September, 1939, when the war began, White was a member of the 
Union of Concerted Peace Efforts, an outgrowth of the League of Nations 
Non-partisan Committee for Peace Through Revision of the Neutrality Law. 
White was selected to serve as chairman.4 
This committee did key work in the successful fight for revision of the 
neutrality laws, and White earned the personal thanks of President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Butas the war progressed, 
and it became painfully obvious that only the determination and dogged courage 
of the British was holding back a complete Nazi conquest, it was natural that 
White should again be in the forefront. Like each of the previous committees 
on which he had served, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies 
was born to meet the needs of the hour . 5 His leadership was necessary to 
the committee, and it provided an appropriate culmination to his career . 
At the outset White wrote that he feared he was nmerely the rooster on 
the cow catcher," but he was much more than that. He was the central figure 
in the phenominal growth of the committee, as well as the only real link 
between the committee and the White House. Under his control the member-
ship of the committee mushroomed. In a month the committee was large and 
influential enough to exert pressure on Congress, and it grew until it had 750 
chapters spread across the country. 
But to a large extent it grew like Topsie, and in that lay the seeds of 
the crisis which overtook it in December, 1940. The ruling body was theo-
retically the National Committee, but in practice the local chapters were 
virtually autonomous. They were permitted to carry out National policy as 
they pleased, as long as they adhered to the policy itself. The local officers 
were selected locally and the National Committee had no disciplinary power 
over the local groups. 7 
In most areas this presented no problem, but in New York the situation 
was different. The National Headquarters and the New York Chapter were 
independent of one another and they soon began to show signs of working at 
cross purposes. The New York Chapter was considerably more bellicose 
than the committee as a whole. It was soon suspected in isolationist circles 
that the direction of the entire committee was falling into the hands of a small 
clique which controlled the New York Chapter. The reputable but isolationist 
and pacifist Christian Century strongly implied in November, 1940, that 
Herbert Agar and the so-called "Century Group" were the guiding spirits 
behind the committee. It went on to point out, "But it must be recognized 
that there is this active pressure toward intervention at the center of the 
movement—this little group of men who are continually making their influ-
ence felt in the committee^ policies and program. . . . " 
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Individual members and chapters began to raise the issue directly with 
White, and replies from the National Committee to the effect that "Many of 
us feel that a timid policy of only half-hearted aid to Britain is in danger of 
bringingus into war eventually and then under the most unfavorable conditions," 
did nothing to settle the unrest in the mid-west .9 
A new policy statement formulated on November 26 aggravated the situ-
ation by coming close to the sore spot of convoys. It said, "The life line 
between Great Britain and the United States is the sea route to the Western 
Hemisphere. Under no circumstances must this line be cut and the United 
States must be prepared to maintain i t . The United States should supply Great 
Britain with all possible merchant vessels to fly the British f lag ." 1 0 
By early December a re-organization of the committee could be delayed 
no longer. Internal differences were too great to be ignored. Accordingly 
White outlined a nine point plan to Clark Eichelberger, the National Director. 
He proposed a National Policy Board to formulate the policy which the New 
York Chapter would be required to follow. The board was to have represent-
ation from each chapter, and New York was to have two representatives, 
Frank Kingdon, a naturalized Englishman, and Herbert Bayard Swope, Director 
of the New York Chapter. The New York Chapter was still to be autonomous. 
It was to receive $400 a week from the National Committee, pay its own bills, 
and institute no general fund raising. Any money which it raised was to be 
divided equally with the National Committee, and it was to confine its activities 
to greater New York . 1 1 
White, because of the illness of his wife and his own failing health, did 
not feel it possible to go to New York to fight the issue out in person. Instead 
he entrusted the negotiations to the men in charge of the National Committee 
and the New York Chapter. The situation was almost hopeless and the first 
meeting between the two groups only widened the g a p . 1 2 But a week later 
Swope, the chief New York representative, was more agreeable. He wrote 
White that the New York Chapter had "voted to accept in principle" the out-
line of relations as forwarded to the National Committee. In his letter he 
held out the possibiHty of agreement with the statement that, "The few points 
at issue will be resolved, no doubt, by talks to be held with you and the others 
of your group by Mr. Goldsmith and George F ie ld . " 1 3 
But just when a settlement seemed to be within reach, a new factor 
was added to the internal difficulties of the committee. White learned that the 
Scripps-Howard newspapers were preparing an attack on the committee. 
At just about the same time White also received a copy of a letter from former 
Congressman Bruce Barton to Roy Roberts of the Kansas City Star. Barton 
told Roberts that White, because of his prestige, held the power of good or 
harm for the country. If White really wanted to keep the country out of war, 
Barton continued, " . . . then he ought to say so far as he is concerned the 
limit of aid Tshort of war ' means no American ships and no convoying.frl^ 
White knew that such a statement would come close to contradicting the 
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November 26 policy of the committee, but he decided to speak out in an effort 
to forestall the planned isolationist attack until the committee dissension was 
resolved. To do this he wrote a personal letter to his old friend Roy Howard 
of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain. Howard wished to publish the letter 
and White gave his permission. It appeared on December 23, and with it the 
final crisis was at hand. 
White, in his own words ," . . . felt it proper to deny the common 
charges of our opponents that we were in favor of four dangerous proposals: 
Firs t , deliberately aiming at war; second, espousing proposals that would 
immediately lead to war, the three proposals being, convoys, sending 
American ships with contraband of war into belligerent waters, and the repeal 
of the Johnson Act. I denied that we were in favor of either of these four 
things [ s i c ] . n 1 6 
White's statement effectively broke the committee into segments. It 
placed him in direct opposition to the New York Chapter. The National 
Committee met immediately, and in conjunction with the big city chapters of 
the east coast made an effort to avert division. They prepared a statement 
and Swope, in a telegram on December 24, urged White to issue it in an 
"unqualified manner." "Unless it i s , " he continued, "I am fearful all good 
work you have done will go to smash. Scripps Howard papers called your 
statement repudiation of the White Committee. That is why action is imper-
ative." In a tone verging on the condescending he concluded, "I hate to see 
you dragooned into position not of opposing war but of seemingly opposing 
big thing the committee is seeking." 1 7 
White, of course, was not a person to be dragooned, either by Swope 
or anyone else. He kept his counsel while the reactions to his statement 
began to roll in. White, always a recipient of a large volume of personal 
correspondence, began to hear in increasing numbers from the individual 
members of the chapters, and from the common people of the country. The 
flood continued for weeks afterward, and ranged from fanatic devotion to 
fanatic opposition. It continued with as much support and as much bitterness 
after White1 s resignation as before. It was not a directly measurable personal 
phenomenon, but it must have affected him deeply.1 8 
If the private reactions of White cannot be known with certainly, however, 
the public reactions of the America Firs t Committee can. Strongly isolationist 
and eventually accused of being pro-Nazi, this committee was headed by 
General Robert E. Wood.19 In the newspapers of December 26 he was quoted 
as saying,". . . national unity will have been achieved" if the two committees 
should agree to oppose convoys of armaments to Br i ta in . 2 0 At the same time 
Charles Lindbergh, most popular of all the American Fi rs t supporters also 
issued a statement. With great skill he managed to condemn White's com-
mittee, and at the same time praise White. 
He said, "Many of us have felt in the past that Mr. White's committee 
was intentionally leading us to war. We knew that certain supporters of the 
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committee have discussed what steps Tshort of war ' would lead to war most 
quickly." Then he concluded, "The important thing is that we unite on the 
destiny of America; on the necessity of building strength at home and keeping 
out of war abroad. In this Mr. White has today given us an example of true 
leadership ." 2 1 
On December 26 White had still not acted, although he was preparing 
a public letter of a conciliatory nature addressed to Lindbergh.22 The 
Committee was desperately attempting to get White to issue another public 
statement. A committee telegram to Roosevelt pledging " . . . full support 
in your policy of lending all aid necessary to Great Britain" had appeared in 
the same newspaper editions as the statements of Wood and Lindbergh, but it 
was likely to be meaningless unless a supporting statement by White was 
immediately forthcoming.23 In desperation Eichelberger wired White, "In 
the light of almost twenty years friendship and my loyalty to you please believe 
me when I say misunderstanding over your Howard interview having national 
repercussions and unless we can agree quickly on statement sent you our 
movement is threatened with disaster . " 2 ^ 
Meanwhile the New York Chapter, with a membership of 16, 000, had 
done with delay. They issued a statement announcing, "We will not be 
intimidated by the word 'war-monger.T " In a second statement four members 
of the executive committee announced a policy meeting for the following 
Monday with the comment that the November policy statement was expected 
to be "reaffirmed and strengthened." As the New York Times remarked, 
signs of ferment seemed evident.2^ 
But while the New York Chapter was going its own way White was 
writing a letter of explanation to Lewis Douglas about the whole affair. 
After stating exactly what he had done, he said, "I did not consult the Exec-
utive Committee or the Policy Committee because I supposed and still think, 
I was entirely inside of the intentions of the Committee as expressed by the 
policy of November 26." 
He commented on the support for his position in the middle west, and 
then, for the first time, brought up resignation. He wrote, "My resignation 
seems inevitable if even a minority of the Committee feel that this policy is 
unwise. My one earnest wish is that in giving out the news of my resignation 
we save our Committee from embarrassment and from harm. I have asked 
Mr. Eichelberger to let the matter ride until I come to New York in late 
January when The Churchman will honor our Committee by giving me an 
award for the work the Committee has done. That willbeagood springboard 
from which to announce that a younger man is needed in this place; that a 
year ' s strain has taken its toll upon my mind and body and that I want to 
be relieved from the work."2^ 
White concluded that, "I earnestly hope that no statement or commit-
ment will be made which will force this issue at this t ime," but he was to 
be immediately disappointed in that hope. Eichelberger tried to do his part 
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by denying on December 28 the reports of "growing differences among some 
groups of William Allen WhiteTs Committee. . . . " His effort was completely 
unavailing as a new explosion engulfed the entire commit tee . 2 7 
Major Fiorello LaGuardia of New York, a committee member, and 
a friend of White, publicly aligned himself with the radical New York Chapter 
members by issuing to the press a letter he was sending to White. A bitter 
document, it almost seemed composed in the heat of passion. It read: 
My dear and good friend: 
I read your statement saying what the Committee to 
Defend America by Aiding the Allies would not do. Strange, 
when the going was good for the Allies, you and others were 
strong in saying what you would do. Now that the going is 
bad, you are doing a typical Laval. 
It occurred to me that the committee had better divide. 
You could continue as chairman of the "Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies with Words" and the rest of us 
would join a "Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies 
with Deeds." That would at least identify the division which 
I am sure your statement will cause. 
If you will send me the addresses of the members of 
the advisory committee as contained on your letterhead, I 
will be glad to send them each a copy of this letter. 
With kind personal regards and hoping to have the 
pleasure of seeing you soon, and with best wishes for as 
happy a New Year as is possible by simply Aiding the Allies 
with Words, I am 
Sincerely yours, 
F . H. LaGuardia, Mayor2 8 
White had a high regard for LaGuardia, and for his political integrity. 
LaGuardia had been among those urging White to take the Committee chair-
manship. It was unfortunate, therefore, that White had to learn of LaGuardiaT s 
letter through the p ress . The Mayor had sent the letter to White through the 
National Committee, and that body, thinking that LaGuardia would not release 
it to the press , held it. Not until December 31 was it sent to Whi te . 2 9 
In the meantime, Swope took the opportunity provided by LaGuardia 
to further widen the gap between the New York Chapter and the res t of the 
committee. In a telephone interview on December 29, he said he was " . . . 
convinced the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies is bigger 
than any single individual." In sympathy with LaGuardia, he stated he could 
" . . . understand the impatience of many who resent the confusion produced 
by what we might call Mr. WhiteTs indiscretion."3 0 
But despite the fact that letters condemning LaGuardia came to him, 
and despite the fact that he had the sympathy and support of practically all of 
the chapters outside of New York, White decided that the issue had,in fact, 
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been forced. On January 2, 1941, he announced his resignation as chairman 
of the commit tee . 3 1 
In a personal letter of April 2, 1941, White attributed his resignation 
to the illness of Mrs . White, because that made it impossible to go back to 
New York to "fight out a proposal which seemed to me important and upon 
which I and the Committee d i sagree . " 3 2 This was, of course, the interven-
tionist spirit of the New York Chapter, and even in his resignation, White 
attempted to quell it, as he wrote feelingly in the Gazette on January 2, that 
" . . . 1 have never heard war as an alternate objective seriously discussed 
by any official group of our organization at any t ime." And he concluded 
rrAny organization that is for war is certainly playing HitlerTs game ." 3 3 In 
both explanations the common factor is the interventionist element in New 
York. White reacted to it. 
W. L. White, in finishing his father1 s autobiography, characterized his 
father as representing a sort of average public opinion. If he seemed confused, 
or ambivalent, it was because the public itself was confused.3^ He considered 
both the mass of letters he received and the reasoning of men he respected. 
His sense of public reputation and of duty to the hundreds of thousands of 
people who placed their trust in him impelled him toward the resignation. 
White added a postscript to the Douglas letter. It read, "For the last six 
weeks I have been receiving letters from intelligent people who were members 
of our committee, or its supporters, deploring the fact that we were going 
too far and too fast toward war. These came from men whose judgement I 
respect. They were not appeasers. They just didn't see the new phase of 
our act ivi ty."3 5 
White might also have added that he respected the judgement of some 
of the men who opposed his committee, notably Roy Howard, Roy Roberts of 
the Kansas City Star, and Bruce Barton. He respected and had a long friend-
ship with Oswald Garrison Villard who wired him on December 30, "Deeply 
concerned your situation in regard to your committee and profoundly eager 
that your splendid standing in the country should not be clouded. In friendly 
spirit urge your resignation."3^ 
Likewise, he had great admiration for LaGuardia, and for many of the 
other committee members who attacked him for taking a moderate stand. 
Among this number was Philip Wylie, founder of the Miami committee 
chapter, who wired him on the same day as Villard, "Because I feel that your 
recent statements have impugned the dignity of your committee members and 
shown a gross incomprehension of world affairs and our own peril , I do now 
resign from your commit tee ." 3 7 
Possibly all of these men influenced White in the direction of his natural 
tendencies. When these last two wires were sent, White's choice had prob-
ably already been made. On December 28, he had been thinking of resignation 
if agreement were impossible. LaGuardia's outburst made the extent of 
disaffection clear» White had either to defeat the committee radicals or to 
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witness the joint destruction of the committee and his own reputation in the 
execution of their policies. The fact that he could not go to New York was 
irrelevant to the main issue. After the negotiations of late November and 
early December; after the back-handed near-insults of Herbert Bayard Swope; 
and after the LaGuardia letter there was no question about the New Yorkers 
listening to reason. They were as fanatic as the isolationist radicals of the 
America Firs t Committee. The only weapon White could use against them 
was his reputation, and the only way he could use it was to resign. ^ 
Whether or not the resignation served the purpose intended by White 
was not immediately clear. The newspaper reaction was thoroughly mixed. 
The isolationist papers tended to claim that it only proved what they had 
thought all along, and columnist Boake Carter said as much outright. The 
more moderate St. Louis Post-Dispatch said, "If the ex-White Committee 
has become too radical for its creator, it has become too radical for the 
American people." The Los Angeles Times, normally at least a luke-warm 
supporter of the committee, missed the mark entirely with, "He is too forth-
right a man to keep on with a committee with which he was fundamentally at 
odds. If there were disagreements, they evidently were on relatively minor 
questions."3 9 
It is significant, however, that White retained among his papers an 
editorial from the Illinois State Register which apparently reflected his 
point of view accurately, and indicated the end he hoped to achieve. It read: 
Foremost, America must keep the life line open 
between the United States and Great Britain, and must 
give the President every encouragement and support in 
his policy of aid to Great Britain. WE MUST IMPRESS 
UPON CONGRESS THE NEED TO BACK HIM. 
That is a firm basis for the committee's future 
program. It sweeps away any inconsistencies a t t r i -
butable to Mr. White in the past and provides common 
ground for committee action in the future through a 
policy group authorized by the entire membership and 
known to the public. 4° 
At the time this editorial was written the reorganization which White had 
previously attempted was already underway. On January 4, just two days after 
his resignation, the plan for selection of vice-chairmen from different sections 
of the country, and the establishment of a policy board was discussed at an execu-
tive committee meeting. Moreover, the New York Chapter itself was forced to 
retract, and Frank Kingdon was authorized to convey to White " . . . the high esteem 
in which we hold you personally and the keen appreciation that we have of your 
statesmanlike l eader sh ip . . . . " A measure of the distrust gene rated within that 
Chapter is the fact that another New York Chapter member also wrote to White 
to tell him the same thing, and to underline the words, "Dr. Kingdon was author-
ized at our last meeting to convey all this to you."^! 
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White privately endorsed control of the committee by a group of men 
who had closely supported him while he was chairman. On January 10 he 
received the thanks of Clark Eichelberger, Fred McKee, and Hugh Moore for 
his support and learned that they seemed to have the situation under control. 
White, himself, was elected honorary chairman, Lewis Douglas, chairman 
of the board, and Ernest W. Gibson, former Senator from Vermont, chair-
man of the committee. 4 2 
This leadership was strictly moderate and, although it lacked some of 
the raw dynamism displayed on occasions by the America Fi rs t Committee, 
it was also above attack. Its reputation was virtually unquestioned, and it 
played an important role in gaining popular support for the lend-lease bill in 
early 1941. White was consulted throughout, and the factions of Swope and 
Kingdon never seriously threatened the purposes of the committee again. In 
this sense WhiteTs resignation was a success.^3 
Franklin Roosevelt summed up this success when he wrote to White in 
July, 1941, " . . . 1 think it sobered certain elements within the committee 
to such an extent that they have been watching their step ever since ,rr 4 4 
More could not be expected. 
Marietta (Ohio) Daily Times 
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